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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KIRK W. DALL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
j
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STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and
the PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW
BOARD,

Case No. 930722-CA

Priority No. 13

Defendants and Appellees.

1
BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal arises from the district court's refusal to
grant Dall's request for relief in a petition for extraordinary
relief.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (g) (Supp. 1993),

this Court has jurisdiction because Dall was convicted of a
second-degree felony.
Dallfs petition requested the trial court to overturn the
Psychiatric Security Review Board's (PSRB!s) order discharging
him from the Utah State Hospital and transferring him to the
Board of Pardons.

Dall has conceded in his opening brief that

the trial court proceeding was a quasi-appellate review of the

1

agency hearing.

This Court acts as a second level of appellate

review, primarily reviewing the record of the administrative
proceedings as well as the evidence placed into the record at the
trial court.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does State v. Buraess. 870 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1994)

dispose of Dallfs claims that the PSRB violated the
constitutional prohibition on "ex post facto11 laws and the
statutory prohibition on retroactivity?
2.

Was the PSRB's decision that Dall had reached "maximum

benefit" supported by substantial evidence?
3.

Was Dall's claim that transfer to the prison

constituted cruel and unusual punishment ripe for adjudication?
4.

Did the PSRB unlawfully exercise judicial power by

transferring Dall from the state hospital to the prison?
5.

Did Dall have a constitutional right to appeal directly

from the PSRB!s decision, which was violated by the legislature's
failure to statutorily provide for direct appeal?
6.

Did the PSRB transfer hearing constitute a part of the

criminal prosecution, thus entitling him to compulsory process.

2

STMPARP OF APPELLATE REVIEW
When reviewing a trial court decision in a petition for
extraordinary relief, the appellate court "looks at the
administrative proceeding as if the petition were brought here
[to the appellate court] directly, even though technically it is
the district court's decision that is being appealed.

Tolman v.

Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991).
Under this standard, this Court gives no deference to the
district court's initial appellate review because it was a review
of the record, "which this court is just as capable of reviewing
as the district court."

id; Benni-cn v, State Bdr of Oil, 3ag fc

Mining. 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Utah 1983).
However, if the trial court took evidence other than the
administrative record and based its decision, in part, on that
testimony, this Court defers to the trial court on findings of
fact resulting from that evidence.

Davis County v. Clearfield

City. 756 P.2d 704, 710 (Utah App. 1988) ("Therefore, insofar as
the trial court's decision turns on the administrative record, we
give no particular deference to the trial court.

But insofar as

it turns on the testimony of witnesses, we defer to the trial
court's advantaged position."),

3

Thus, in terms of the appellate standard of review, this
case presents an unusual bifurcation:

reviewing the

administrative agency record directly without giving deference to
the trial court1, but reviewing the trial courtfs findings of
fact based on evidence other than the administrative record by a
deferential standard.

Id.

In making that review of the PSRB's hearing, the Court
upholds the agency decision if it based on any evidence of

substance.

Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public

Service Com!n. 658 P.2d 601, 607-12 (Utah 1983) .2

In reviewing

the evidence from the trial court, the Court applies a clearlyerroneous standard.

In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 191, 193

(Utah 1987) .

1

Nevertheless, as this Court recognized in Davis County,
the statement that an appellate court gives no deference to a
trial court's analysis is "a bit of an overstatement.11 Though
deference is not required, the appellate court derives "great
benefit from the trial judge's views on the issue and may be
persuaded by those views." Id. citing Zions First Natf1 Bank v.
National Am, Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988).
2

Administrative Services discussed the appropriate
standards of judicial review pre-UAPA. Because this kind of
hearing before the PSRB was not subject to UAPA, the review
standard in Administrative Services applies. For more discussion
on this issue, see Point III.
4

Additionally, the appellant's requirement to marshall t
evidence applies, Qneida/SLIC v. Oneidd ,.Id Storage and
23b Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 2b

Warehouse, Iu»

(Utah App. April
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-1 (repealed 1992).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 (repealed 1992).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5 (repealed 1992).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (Supp. 1993).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (repealed 1990).
Utah R.Crim.P. 21.5 (1994)3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural

History

This case is an appeal from the trial court!s quasiappellate review of a July 28, 1991 hearing before the PSRB, at
the conclusion of which the PSRB decided that Dall had reached
maximum benefit from the services available at the Utah State
Hospital and should be transferred to the Utah State Board of
Pardons.

(R. at 568). The PSRB ordered Dall held in the

3

When the legislature deleted court rules from the
statutory code in 1989, the Judicial Council adopted most of the
then-existing rules without change. Rule 21.5, Utah Rules of
Criminal -Procedure is identical then to Utah Code Ann. § 77-3521.5 (repealed 1990) except that subsections (c) and (d) were not
approved by the Supreme Court on the basis of State v. Copeland.
765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988). Because the rule has not been amended
to keep up with the various changes in the statutory procedures
for treatment of the mentally ill, such as the dissolution of the
PSRB, much of the rule as presently written is meaningless. For
purposes of this brief, appellee will cite to the statutory
version of this language as it existed before its repeal.
6
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imposed on December 23, 1993.

Statement

of

Facts

Dall pled guilty and mentally ill in 1989 to two
second-degree felonies: one count of forcible sexual abuse and
one count of kidnapping.

Third District Court Judge Timothy

Hanson ordered Dall sent to the Utah State Hospital for a mental
evaluation.

On August 10, 1989, Judge Hanson issued an order

transferring Dall to the jurisdiction of the PSRB.

After hearing

from Dall's treating physician at the hospital, Dr. Philip
Washburn, the PSRB decided that Dall had reached maximum benefit
and should be transferred to the Board.

Before the Board of

Pardons could formally assume jurisdiction, however, Dall
obtained a stay from Third District Court Judge Scott Daniels and
filed this petition.

Dall also filed an appeal in this Court

from the PSRB's decision.
910273-CA).

(Dall v. State of Utah, Case No.

The appeal was later dismissed due to lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction.

(R. at 571).

The PSRB initially considered Dall's transfer on April 19,
1991 and determined that he should be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the Board.

However, the recording equipment

malfunctioned and, in order to perfect Dall's appeal, this Court
8

ordered the PSRB to hold the hearing again.
1*1
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I

Three individuals testified before the trial court at the
June 4, 1993 evidentiary hearing: Br. Washburn; Br. Robert
Howell; a psychologist who had evaluated Ball; and Robert
Verville, formerly superintendent of the state hospital and
current associate director of the Utah Bivision of Mental Health.
Br, Washburn testified to the statements he made at the PSRB
hearing in 1991. Additionally, Br. Washburn gave his opinion
that based on his interview with Ball the week before, and review
of the medical notes, Ball's condition had not changed since the
time of the evidentiary hearing in 1991.

(R. at 636-37) .

Verville discussed the state hospital's clinical standards
in deciding whether a patient should be transferred to the Board.
He testified that the legislative codification of the term
"maximum benefit" did not change hospital policy, as it had been
practiced in 1988 or 1989.

(R. at 697-99).

Verville stated that

throughout Ball's time in the hospital, the practice had remained
the same. Id.

Verville also testified about the mental health

conditions at the state prison and the effect of a recent federal
consent decree on continuing improvements at the prison.
691-95).

10

(R.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Dall makes numerous challenges to the PSRB's decision to
transfer him to the Board, including ex post facto,
retroactivity, lack of sufficient evidence, cruel and unusual
punishment, separation of powers, and violation of sixth
amendment rights. None of these claims have merit.

Due to the

doctrine of stare decisis, the claims regarding ex post facto and
retroactivity have already been answered in the case of State v.
Burgess. 870 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1994).
Additionally, the PSRB's was based on substantial evidence
that Dall had reached maximum benefit and should be placed in the
Utah State Prison system instead of the hospital.

There was

evidence before the PSRB, reiterated at the trial level, showing
that Dall had reached a plateau in his condition that warranted
transfer.

ARCTMENT
I.

THIS COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V. BURGESS. 870
P.2D 276 (UTAH APP. 1994) DISPOSES OF DALL'S
CHALLENGE TO THE PSRB BASED UPON THE PROHIBITIONS
ON EX POST FACTO AND RETROACTIVE LAWS.

On February 15, 1994, this Court issued a decision in State
v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1994), in which it held that
application of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 did not violate the ex

11

post facto clause or an illegal application of a statute
retroactively.

Burgess was convicted of a criminal offense and

sent to the Utah State Training School. When he was committed,
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-8(4) (repealed 1992) simply stated that
the Board of Pardons would decide whether a defendant, proposed
to be discharged from the hospital, should be placed on parole or
committed to prison.

Burgess, 870 P.2d at 278. During Burgess1

commitment at the school, the legislature repealed section 7716a-8 and enacted in its place Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203.
Section 77-16a-203 establishes a detailed process for review
of individuals criminally committed to the state hospital.

That

review requires both the hospital and the prison to create teams
of clinicians who evaluate the patient and make a recommendation.
Id- n. 1.

Because section 77-16a-8 had been repealed, the

training school was unclear as to the procedure that had to be
followed to transfer Burgess to the prison.

Thus, the county

attorney went before the Court seeking an order stating the
appropriate procedure to follow.4

4

Apparently, the school sought Burgess1 transfer because
he could not be securely maintained at the facility and was not
accepting treatment. Burgess. 870 P.2d at 276.

12

The trial court in Burgess ruled that the current statute,
section 77-163-203, governed Burgess1 placement and ordered him
maintained at the school pending proceedings consistent with that
law.

id-

Burgess appealed from the order.

On appeal, Burgess

argued that the application of section 77-16a-203 was ex post
facto illegally retroactive.

This Court denied both claims, for

three different reasons.
First, this Court ruled that the statute governing the
placement process in the repealed statute, section 77-16a-8, was
not a "vested" right in which Burgess had a protectible interest.
Xd. at 278. As stated by the Court, the transfer process was not
part of Burgess1 sentence but merely a placement procedure that
was not "ripe until the recommendation for transfer was
submitted."5

Id.

Second, the Court also ruled that application of current law
would not violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto
laws.

Id- at 279,n. 3.

The ex post facto clause prohibits the

state from imposing a harsher or more burdensome punishment than
could have been imposed when the crime was committed.

5

Id.

The recommendation for Burgess1 transfer was not
submitted until October 1992, after section 77-16a-203 became
law.
13

Burgessf sentence did not increase as a result of the change in
the transfer process: both before and after the enactment of the
law, Burgess was subject to three consecutive one-to-fifteen year
sentences.
Finally, the Court also ruled that even accepting Burgess1
retroactivity claim, application of the new law still would not
be unlawfully retroactive because it changed only procedure. Jj£.
Statutes that make only procedural changes in the law, i.e., in
the "judicial machinery for enforcing rights," are not improper.
See State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) .
Thus, the trial court's decision to apply current law in Burgess1
case did not violate either the ex post facto or retroactivity
prohibitions.
Although non-material facts are different, the legal
analysis and conclusions here parallel those in Burgess.

In

1988, when Dall committed his crime, and in 1989, when he was
sentenced, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (repealed 1990) allowed
transfer when the hospital "proposes to discharge" a person who
had been adjudicated guilty and mentally ill. As recognized in
Burgess in its interpretation of similar language in section 7716a-8, this provision did not require discharge into the
community but only discharge from the hospital to the
14

jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons, fturgess. 870 P.2d at 279,
n. 6.
Statutory language when Dall committed his crime contained
no guidance to steer either the hospital's discretion in
discharging him or the Board's discretion in committing him to
prison.

As a result of the 1990 amendment, which added the term

"maximum benefit," both the state hospital and the PSRB were
obligated to find that Dall had reached a certain level of
stability to transfer.

Thus, as in Burgess, application of the

1990 "maximum benefit" statute did not harm Dall's case or make
his transfer more likely.

Due to the imposition of the maximum

benefit standard, the state was statutorily obligated to meet a
higher burden to effect transfer than under the old statute.
Neither the legislature's addition of the term "maximum
benefit" nor the PSRB's application of it to Dall, violated the
ex post facto or retroactivity proscriptions, namely because use
of the standard did not disadvantage Dall.

The testimony before

the trial court at the evidentiary hearing showed that indeed the
maximum benefit codification essentially adopted the hospital's
practice before 1990. The following colloquy contains Mr.
Verville's testimony on the matter:

15

Q [Mr. Beadles] In the review process that you
oversaw, and transferring somewhat to the PSRB, or
making that recommendation, what was the standard, what
clinical standard, in your opinion, was used and looked
at in 1989?
[Objection omitted]
THE WITNESS Again, as I tried to indicate
earlier, it was a clinical standard wherein the
treating psychiatrist and his clinical team would
review the progress of the inmate, or excuse me, the
patient, and determine whether or not he had received
everything that the hospital had to offer for
opportunities for improvement with his condition.
Q [BY MR. BEADLES]
were used in 1991?

Were those the same criteria that

A

Yes.

Q

Are you familiar with the term "maximum benefit"?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you know where that term came from?

A
My understanding of where that term came from was
out of the creation of the guilty-mentally ill law, and
it's a standard that is currently being used at the
hospital now for referral. It, however, maintains, to
my understanding, that same definition that I gave you.
Itfs not a written, defined term. Ifs simply the
clinical team, including the psychiatrist and his
clinical team making the recommendations that this
person has benefitted as much as they can offer.
Q
the
the
and
the

As you see it [unintelligible] looking back over
years that you've been involved in this process,
term "maximum benefit" is a codification of policy
practice of the Utah State Hospital from 1989 to
present?
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A
Right. If anything, it's becoming more stringent
in that there's more review now than there was in 1989.
•

*

*

Q
All right. Going back to 1989-1991,
differentiating those two standards, in your opinion,
was the standard used in 1991 harsher than the 1989
standard?
A
I would see them as being very similar at that
time.
Q
And that is in the sense that it puts the same
type of burden on the State Hospital and the PSRB to
make that determination?
[Objection omitted]
THE WITNESS: Yes.
(R. at 697-99).
Thus, the evidence at trial established that the hospitalfs
pre-1990 policy corresponded with the "maximum benefit" standard
in 1990. Even if the hospital had used the pre-1990 transfer
provision (which contained no standards), the result would have
been no different.6

6

In an attempt to circumvent this problem in the case, two
weeks before the evidentiary hearing, Dall argued in his pretrial brief that the state hospital and the PSRB were obligated
to use a different standard: Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 (1990),
which prohibits transfer of certain offenders unless the director
of the state hospital certifies that they have "sufficiently
recovered" from their mental illness. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5
(1990). Not only was this claim never raised at the PSRB hearing
(and thus waived pursuant to Smith v. Batchelor. 832 P.2d 467,
470 n.4 (Utah 1992)) or in either the original or amended
17

In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah
Supreme Court ruled that stare decisis applied to the several
panels of this Court,

Therefore, "the first decision by a court

on a particular question of a law governs later decisions by the
same court."

Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1269. This case is identical

in fact and law to Burgess: thus, under the doctrine of stare
decisis, Dall's claims must be answered similarly to those in

Burgess-

2s& State v, Shculderblade, 858 p.2d. 1049, 1051 (Utah

App. 1993) (co-defendant separately appealed his conviction on
same issues and facts; therefore, decision in co-defendantfs
appeal served as binding precedent under doctrine of stare
decisis).
II.

BECAUSE DALL FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF EITHER THE PSRB'S OR THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION, THIS COURT SHOULD ACCEPT BOTH SETS OF
FINDINGS AS VALID.

Dall challenges the PSRB's decision to transfer Dall and the
trial court's affirmance of that agency decision.

However, he

has failed to carry the "heavy burden appellants must bear when

petitions, this claim is simply wrong. Judge Hanson clearly
stated that he was sentencing Dall pursuant to the guilty and
mentally ill provisions of section 77-35-21.5. (Tr. Hearing
before Judge Timothy Hanson, Third District Court, State v. Dall.
Case Number 8819911695, July 28, 1989, at 63-64; Petitioner's
Exhibit No. 5). Section 77-16-5 applies to individuals who are
found guilty, a plea separate from guilty and mentally ill.
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challenging factual findings."

Qneida/SLIC. 236 Utah Adv. at 25.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for appellants, in
general, to marshall the evidence adequately.

Dall, in

particular, also has failed to meet that obligation.
As stated in Qneida/SLIC. the first step in marshalling the
evidence is to present

ffl

every scrap of competent evidence

introduced at trial which supports
appellant resists.111

the very findings the

JL£; citing West Valley City v. Majestic

Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).

After appellant

has marshalled the supporting evidence, he must then show why the
courtfs findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence,
i.e., the "fatal flaw."

Qneida/SLIC. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25.

When an appellant has failed to marshall the evidence in
of the

trial

court's

factual

findings,

support

this Court has

consistently refused to review the findings and has accepted them
as valid.

As in Qneida/SLIC. Dallfs recitation of the evidence

from both the agency and trial court hearings, are merely
"carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony in
support of [his] position."

Id.

Dall has not marshalled the

evidence in support of the PSRBfs or trial court's findings;
therefore, this Court should accept both sets of findings as
valid.
19

III. THE PSRB HAD BEFORE IT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT ITS OPINION THAT DALL HAD REACHED MAXIMUM
BENEFIT FROM THE SERVICES AVAILABLE AT THE STATE
HOSPITAL; THEREFORE, THE AGENCY'S DECISION WAS
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.
In reviewing an administrative agency action, this Court
affirms the decision if based on substantial evidence.

SEMECO

Industriesr Inct v, Utfrh s m e Tax Com'n, 849 p.2d 1167, 11721173 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J. dissenting); Utah Department of
Administrative Services v. Public Service Com'n, 658 P.2d 601,

607-12 (Utah 1983).

Administrative Services was the supreme

Court's leading interpretation of the standards by which a court
reviewed agency actions before enactment of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA).
Because the PSRB was exempted from UAPA, the standard of
review set forth in Administrative Services should also govern
this Court's review of the PSRB hearing.

The pre-UAPA

"substantial evidence test" provided less latitude for judicial
review than the current UAPA standard of the same name.
849 P.2d at 1173.

SEMECO.

In Administrative Services, the Court

interpreted the test to mandate affirmance of an agency finding
whenever "evidence of any substance whatever" supports the

findings of fact." id. citing Administrative Services/ 658 p.2d
at 609. Thus, just as the trial court was bound to afford
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significant deference to the PSRB, so this Court is similarly
bound.
The evidence at the PSRB hearing, repeated at the trial
court, was that Dall had received all the help from the state
hospital that he could receive from the hospital and that the
state prison could provide him the same treatment.

Although Dall

points out that he will need treatment for the rest of his life,
chronological duration is not the focus of the maximum benefit
test.

That test is met if the facts show the following:

(1) the

patient has received medication and other forms of treatment at
the hospital and his mental functioning has improved; (2) the
patient's condition has remained stable for a reasonable time;
and (3) the state hospital has no additional medications or
therapeutic forms of treatment that will further improve the
patient's mental condition; and (4) another institution, such as
the prison, can provide treatment suitable to maintain the
patient's current condition.
Any other definition makes a mockery of the guilty and
mentally ill laws.

As the state conceded, from the layman's

viewpoint any person would "benefit" more from serving his entire
sentence at the state hospital rather than prison.

However, this

suggested interpretation, if made law, would transform the state
21

hospital into the permanent warehouse for all individuals who
have been convicted as guilty and mentally ill.

The PSRB's

interpretation better balances the conflicting interests in the
guilty and mentally ill placement process:

administering

punishment appropriate for the offense while also enabling the
mentally ill to receive medication and treatment that will lead
to a stable mental condition.

This interpretation also reflects

the most logical intent of the legislation, and conforms with the
agency's past practice.
The PSRB's decision to transfer Dall appropriately met the
definition of "maximum benefit."

The trial elicited additional

evidence supporting the PSRB's transfer decision that Dall had
reached maximum benefit:

Dr. Washburn stated his opinion that

Dall's condition had not changed since the PSRB hearing in 1991.
(R. at 636-37).
IV.

DALL'S CLAIM THAT HE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IF THE TRANSFER WERE ALLOWED TO
PROCEED IS NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION AND IS
SPECULATIVE; THEREFORE, IT IS NOT A GROUND FOR
OVERTURNING THE PSRB'S DECISION.

Dall's cruel and unusual punishment claim is not ripe for
adjudication.

Dall has never been at the prison; therefore, the

prison simply never has subjected Dall to any type of punishment.
Even if the ripeness issue could be overcome, the claim that the
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prison is going to subject Dall to cruel and unusual punishment
is speculative at best.

In essence, Dall asked the trial court

to give him a declaratory judgment that the prison is unable, as
a matter of law, to confine him in a manner consistent with the
cruel and unusual punishment clause.
The "unnecessary rigor" provision of the state constitution
does not lend support to Dallfs argument. When the constitution
was drafted, the word "rigor" meant "sternness, harshness,
cruelty," "that which is harsh or severe; especially an
injustice, oppression or cruelty."

The Century Dictionary of the

English Language 5181 (1890-1891).

This definition does not

create a separately enforceable standard but merely adds strength
to the "cruel and unusual" language contained in the balance of
the provision.

Utah Const, art. I, § 9.

More fundamentally though, Dall's basic claim that the
prison could not treat him properly also is without merit. All
the witnesses who testified stated their opinion, based on
experience from working at the prison, that it had a commendable
program that recently had been significantly improved.

Dall

himself introduced a copy of a settlement agreement and consent
decree from the United States District Court for the District of
Utah in which the prison agreed to significantly improve its
23

mental health unit, even beyond constitutional minima.

Henry v.

Deland. Civil No. 89-C-1124J, April 1, 1993, Order and
Stipulation; Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3).
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial
court stated that it had reviewed the settlement agreement and
concluded that "the facilities at the mental health unit are
neither inadequate, nor cruel and unusual."

(R. at 573). Again,

Dall has not marshalled the evidence in support of this finding
and, therefore, this Court should consider it valid.
Oneida/SLIC, 236 Utah Adv. at 25.
V.

THE PSRB DID NOT ENCROACH UPON JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS;
THEREFORE, THE DECISION TO TRANSFER DALL WAS NOT A
VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Article V of the Utah Constitution divides the powers of
state government into three separate departments -- the
legislative, executive, and judicial. Utah Const, art. V.

It

provides that no person charged with the exercise of powers
belonging to one department can exercise the functions
appertaining to another.

Thus, article V is violated only if

action of one branch encroaches upon the constitutionally
guaranteed power or authority of another.
Utah 246, 170 P. 67 (1917).
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Mutart v. Pratt. 51

In Mutart. the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the
indeterminate sentencing law did not violate the separation of
powers clause.

In that decision, the Court stated:

The right of the court to inflict any punishment at all
is given it by the Legislature, and without some act on
the part of the lawmaking power no such power or duty
would be vested therein; and for that reason I fail to
see wherein the act in question [enactment of the
indeterminate sentencing law] deprives the court of any
power or authority guaranteed to it by the Constitution
of this state.
Mutart. 170 P. at 68. Although the power to impose a sentence is
statutorily vested in the courts, the power to create a
sentencing system is not.

Were a court to impose a sentence not

authorized by law, that imposition of sentence would violate the
legislature's sole authority under article V.
The PSRB did not exercise a judicial function when it
transferred jurisdiction to the Board of Pardons.7 Judge Hanson
already had carried out the judicially-authorized function of
imposing sentence.

The PSRB was merely carrying out that

sentence pursuant to its lawful powers and authority.

Judge

Hanson expressly committed Dall to the jurisdiction of the PSRB.

7

This conclusion logically follows from this Court's
decision in Burgess that the transfer procedure was not part of
the sentence, but merely an administrative placement process.
Thus, this part of Dall's claim also can be resolved via Burgess
pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis.
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That grant of jurisdiction brought with it all the lawful powers
and authority that the legislature gave to the PSRB.

One of

those powers was to decide when Dall was subject to discharge
from the hospital. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (repealed 1990).
VI.

THE LEGISLATURE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE DIRECT
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE PSRB DECISION DOES NOT
VIOLATE DALL'S RIGHT TO AN APPEAL.

Article VIII of the state constitution creates and defines
the jurisdictional authority of the courts.
VIII, § 8 (1984).

Utah Const, art.

The constitution gives district courts

"original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute. . . . "

Jji. Further, that same

provision states that all other courts shall have original and
appellate jurisdiction only as provided by statute. X&-

The

constitution itself only grants courts the power to issue
extraordinary writs. J&.

Except for extraordinary writs then,

the legislature has the constitutional authority to establish the
jurisdiction of the courts.
Before the PSRB hearing at issue here, the legislature chose
to withdraw the right to appeal a decision of the PSRB in this
type of case.8

That right was completely within the

8

To the extent Dall claims his inability to directly
appeal the PSRB!s action violated his rights under article I,
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legislature's power and, contrary to Dallfs argument, did not
leave him without a remedy.

In DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board

of Appeals. 764 P.2d 627 (Utah App. 1988), this Court held that
an administrative agency action can be appealed only if a statute
explicitly creates the right of appeal.

Otherwise, a person must

seek review through the "traditional means" of extraordinary
writ.

DeBry. 764 P.2d at 628. As discussed previously in this

brief, this case provided Dall with precisely that type of
review.
VII. THE PSRB'S HEARING WAS NOT A CRITICAL STAGE IN THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND# THEREFORE, DOES NOT
REQUIRE COMPULSORY PROCESS.
By the time the PSRB decided to transfer Dall, he already
had pled guilty and been sentenced to two terms of one to fifteen
years incarceration.

Tr. Hearing before Judge Hanson, Third

District Court, State v. Dall. Case No. 881991695, July 28, 1989,
at 64) .

section 12, this claim too is met by Burgess• The PSRB simply is
not a part of the criminal process; thus, none of its actions
involve the class of persons, i.e., those accused of criminal
offenses, entitled to the rights granted by article I, section
12. Additionally, if Dall believed that this Court's decision to
dismiss the direct appeal due to lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction was unconstitutional, he should have filed a
petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court.
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As part of that sentence, Dall was committed to the
jurisdiction of the PSRB to be placed in the state hospital for
appropriate treatment.

Again, as clarified in Burgess, the PSRB

did not create a new sentence; it simply carried out the judge's
order and the legislature's sentencing system.
not constitute a part of sentencing.

This process does

In Gardner v. Florida. 43 0

U.S. 349, 358 (1977), the United States Supreme Court stated that
a defendant "has a legitimate interest in the character of the
procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he
may have no right to object to a particular result of the
sentencing process.11

(emphasis added).

Because the PSRB hearing did not impose sentence, but merely
executed a lawfully imposed sentence, the hearing before the PSRB
was not a critical stage entitling him to compulsory process.

For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the decision of the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ^ %h

day of August 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

WifJy
Ja/mes H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Sec. 10.

[Powers denied the states.]

[1.] No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money;
emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a
tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, as post
facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, or
grant any title of nobility.
[2.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision
and Control of the Congress.
[3.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
enter into any Agreements or Compact with another State, or with
a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of law
and just compensation clauses.]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation

Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines - Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall
not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation
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objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in order to
avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in
the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence,
it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive
judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be
made after the court has instructed the jury. Unless
otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon tune
for argument shall be within the discretion of the
court.
i960
77-35-20.

Rule 20 — Exceptions
unnecessary [Repealed effective J u l y 1, 1990].
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party state his objections to the actions of the court and the reasons therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling
or order, the absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him.
i960
77-35-21.

Rule 21 — Verdict [Repealed effective J u l y 1, 1990].
(a) The verdict of the jury shall be either "guilty"
or "not guilty," "not guilty by reason of insanity,"
"guilty and mentally ill," or "not guilty of the crime
charged but guilty of a lesser included offense," or
"not guilty of the crime charged but guilty of a lesser
included offense and mentally ill" provided that when
the defense of mental illness has been asserted and
the defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was
insane at the time of the commission of the offense
charged, the verdict shall be "not guilty by reason of
insanity."
(b) The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall be returned by the jury to the judge in open court and in
the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the defendant voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may
be received in his absence.
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at
any time during its deliberations may return a verdict or verdicts with respect to any defendant as to
whom it has agreed. If the jury cannot agree with
respect to all, the defendant or defendants as to whom
it does not agree may be tried again.
(d) When the defendant may be convicted of more
than one offense charged, each offense of which the
defendant is convicted shall be stated separately in
the verdict.
(e) The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the
offense charged or to any offense necessarily included
in the offense charged or an attempt to commit either
the offense charged or an offense necessarily included
therein.
(f) When a verdict is returned and before it is recorded, the jury shall be polled at the request of any
party or may be polled at the court's own instance. If,
upon the poll, there is not unanimous concurrence,
the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations or may be discharged. If the verdict is unanimous, it shall be recorded.
(g) If judgment of acquittal is given on a verdict or
the case is dismissed and the defendant is not detained for any other legal cause, he shall be discharged as soon as the judgment is given. If a verdict
of guilty is returned, the court may order the defendant to be taken into custody to await judgment on
the verdict or may permit the defendant to remain on
bail.
1963
77-35-21.5. R u l e 21.5 — P l e a claiming mental illness or insanity — E x p e n s e s of
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examination and treatment — Proced u r e s — Verdict — Sentence — Commitment — Discharge — Prison sent e n c e — Parole — Commitment to Psychiatric Security Review Board — Probation [Repealed effective J u l y 1,
1990].
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being
tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court shall
hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine
the claim of mental illness of the defendant. Mental
illness, for this purpose, is determined by the definition stated in Subsection 76-2-305(4). The court may
order the defendant to be evaluated at the Utah State
Hospital or any other suitable facility, and may receive the evidence of any private or public expert witness whose evidence is offered by the defendant or the
prosecutor. A defendant who tenders a plea of "guilty
and mentally ill" shall be examined first by the trial
judge in compliance with the standards for taking
pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be advised that a
plea of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and
not a contingent plea. If the defendant is later found
not to be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise lawfully
made remains a valid plea of guilty. The defendant
shall be sentenced as any other offender. If the court
concludes that the defendant is currently mentally
ill, applying the standards set forth in this section,
the defendant's plea shall be accepted and he shall be
sentenced as a mentally ill offender. Expenses of examination, observation, or treatment, excluding
travel to and from any mental health facility, shall be
charged to the county. When the offense is a state
offense, the state shall pay all of the expense. Travel
expenses shall be charged to the county where prosecution is commenced. Examination of defendants
charged with municipal or county ordinance violations shall be charged to the municipality or county
commencing the prosecution.
(2) (a) If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of
"not guilty by reason of insanity," the court shall
instruct the jury that it may find the defendant
guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser offense, or guilty of a lesser offense due to mental
illness but not an illness which would warrant
full exoneration.
(b) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to
the offense charged, or any lesser offense, the
court shall hold a hearing as provided in this
section, and if the court finds that the defendant
is currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the
defendant as a mentally ill offender.
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and mentally
ill, the court shall impose any sentence which could
be imposed wide** law upon 8 defendant who is convicted of the same offense. Before sentencing, the
court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's present mental state.
(4) The court shall, in its sentence, order commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2 and
hospitalization at the Utah State Hospital if, upon
completion of the hearing and consideration of the
record, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) the defendant has a mental illness as defined by Subsection 76-2-305(4);
(b) because of his mental illness the defendant
poses an immediate physical danger to others or
self, which may include jeopardizing his own or
others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a
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correctional or probation setting, or lacks the
ability to provide the basic necessities of life,
such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on
probation;
(c) the defendant lacks the ability to engage in
a rational decision-making process regarding the
acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated
by evidence of inability to weigh the possible
costs and benefits of treatment;
(d) there is no appropriate treatment alternative to a court order of hospitalization; and
(e) the Utah State Hospital is able to provide
the defendant with treatment, care, and custody
4Ehat is adequate and appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs.
(5) The period of commitment to the jurisdiction of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board under this section may in no circumstance be longer than the maximum sentence imposed by the court.
(6) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review
Board proposes to discharge a defendant from the
Utah State Hospital prior to the expiration of
sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of Pardons a report on the condition of the defendant,
including the clinical facts, the diagnosis, the
course of treatment, the prognosis for the remission of symptoms, the potential for recidivism
and for the danger to himself or the public, and
recommendations for future treatment. The
Board of Pardons shall direct that the defendant
serve any or all of the unexpired term of the sentence at the Utah State Prison, place the defendant on parole, or commit the defendant to the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board for conditional release in accordance with
Chapter 38.
(b) If the Board of Pardons, under law or administrative rules, considers for parole any defendant who has been adjudged guilty and mentally ill, the Board of Pardons shall consult with
the Psychiatric Security Review Board. An additional report on the condition of the defendant
may be filed with the Board of Pardons. Pending
action of the Board of Pardons, the defendant
shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board at the Utah State
Hospital.
(7) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security Review Board shall review the condition of each person
under its jurisdiction at the state hospital under this
section to determine whether custody can be transferred to the Board of Pardons.
(8) If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment
shall, upon the recommendation of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board, be made a condition of parole.
Failure to continue treatment or other condition of
parole except by agreement with the designated mental health services provider and the Board of Pardons
is a basis for initiating parole violation hearings. The
period of parole may not be for fewer than five years
or until the expiration of the defendant's sentence,
whichever comes first, and may not be reduced without consideration by the Board of Pardons of a current report on the mental health status, of the offender.
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty
and mentally ill who is placed on probation by
the sentencing court shall be placed under the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board. The Psychiatric Security Review Board
shall make treatment a condition of probation if
the defendant is shown to be treatable and facili-
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ties exist for treatment of the offender in a probation status. Reports as specified by the trial judge
shall be filed with the probation officer and the
sentencing court.
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other condition of probation, except by agreement with the
treating agency and the Psychiatric Security Review Board, is a basis for the initiation of probation violation hearings. The period of probation
may not be for fewer than five years or until the
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sentencing court without consideration of a current
report on the mental health status of the offender.
(c) Treatment or other care may be provided
by or under contract with the Division of Mental
Health, a local mental health authority, or, with
the approval of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board, any other mental health provider. A report shall be filed with the probation officer and
the sentencing court every three months during
the period of probation. If a motion on a petition
to discontinue probation is made by the defendant, the probation officer shall request a report.
A motion on a petition to discontinue probation
may not be heard more than once every six
months.
(10) (a) With regard to persons committed by the
court to the Utah State Hospital or other facility
under this section prior to July 1,1989, the effective date of this act, the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall petition the court within 60 days after that date for
review of those orders. The court shall review
and modify those orders to include commitment
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board established under Section 77-38-2.
(b) With regard to persons who have been
placed on probation by the sentencing court under Subsection (9) prior to July 1,1989, the effective date of this act, the executive director of the
Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall
petition the court within 60 days after that date
for review of those orders. The court shall review
and modify those orders to include placement under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2.
1969

77-35-22. Rule 22 — Sentence,
judgment
and commitment [Repealed effective
July 1, 19901.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or
plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor
more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or
recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant am opportunity to make a statement in his
own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why
sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present
any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be
tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced in
his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sen-

Rule 21.5. Plea claiming mental illness or insanity - Expenses of
examination and treatment - Procedures - Verdict - Sentence Commitment - Discharge - Prison sentence - Parole - Commitment to
Psychiatric Security Review Board - Probation.
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a
defendant to any charge, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine the claim of mental illness of the
defendant. Mental illness, for this purpose, is determined by the
definition stated in Subsection 76-2-305(4). The court may order
the defendant to be evaluated at the Utah State Hospital or any
other suitable facility, and may receive the evidence of any
private or public expert witness whose evidence is offered by the
defendant or the prosecutor. A defendant who tenders a plea of
"guilty and mentally ill" shall be examined first by the trial
judge in compliance with the standards for taking pleas of
guilty. The defendant shall be advised that a plea of guilty and
mentally ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent plea. If
the defendant is later found not to be mentally ill, a guilty
plea otherwise lawfully made remains a valid plea of guilty. The
defendant shall be sentenced as any other offender. If the court
concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill, applying
the standards set forth in this section, the defendants plea
shall be accepted and he shall be sentenced as a mentally ill
offender. Expenses of examination, observation, or treatment,
excluding travel to and from any mental health facility, shall be
charged to the county, except when the offense is a state
offense, the state shall pay all of the expense. Travel expenses
shall be charged to the county where prosecution is commenced.
Examination of defendants charged with municipal or county
ordinance violations shall be charged to the municipality or
county commencing the prosecution.
(2) (a) If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of "not
guilty by reason of insanity," the court shall instruct the jury
that it may find the defendant guilty, not guilty, not guilty by
reason of insanity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser
offense, or guilty of a lesser offense due to mental illness but
not an illness which would warrant full exoneration.
(b) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to the
offense charged, or any lesser offense, the court shall hold a
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hearing as provided in this section, and if the court finds that
the defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the
defendant as a mentally ill offender.
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and mentally ill, the
court shall impose any sentence which could be imposed under law
upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense. Before
sentencing, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the
defendant's present mental state.
(4) The court shall, in its sentence, order commitment to the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board established
under Section 77-38-2 and hospitalization at the Utah State
Hospital if, upon completion of the hearing and consideration of
the record, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that:
(a) the defendant has a mental illness as defined by
Subsection 76-2-305(4);
(b) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an
immediate physical danger to others or self, which may include
jeopardizing his own or others1 safety, health, or welfare if
placed in a correctional or probation setting, or lacks the
ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food,
clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation; and
(c) the Utah State Hospital is able to provide the
defendant with treatment, care, and custody that is adequate and
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs.
(5) The period of commitment to the jurisdiction of the
Psychiatric Security Review Board under this section may in no
circumstance be longer than the maximum sentence imposed by the
court.
(6) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review Board proposes to
discharge a defendant from the Utah State Hospital prior to the
expiration of sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of Pardons
a report on the condition of the defendant, including the
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of treatment, the
prognosis for the remission of symptoms, the potential for
recidivism and for the danger to himself or the public, and
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recommendations for future treatment. The Board of Pardons shall
direct that the defendant serve any or all of the unexpired term
of the sentence at the Utah State Prison, place the defendant on
parole, or commit the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
Psychiatric Security Review Board for conditional release in
accordance with Chapter 38.
(b) If the Board of Pardons, under law or administrative
rules, considers for parole any defendant who has been adjudged
guilty and mentally ill, the Board of Pardons shall consult with
the Psychiatric Security Review Board. An additional report on
the condition of the defendant may be filed with the Board of
Pardons. Pending action of the Board of Pardons, the defendant
shall remain under the jurisdiction of [the] Psychiatric Security
Review Board of the Utah State Hospital.
(7) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security Review Board
shall review the condition of each person under its jurisdiction
at the state hospital under this section to determine whether
custody can be transferred to the Board of Pardons.
(8) If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment shall, upon
the recommendation of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, be
made a condition of parole. Failure to continue treatment or
other condition of parole except by agreement with the designated
mental health services provider and the Board of Pardons is a
basis for initiating parole violation hearings. The period of
parole may not be for fewer than five years or until the
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever comes first,
and may not be reduced without consideration by the Board of
Pardons of a current report on the mental health status of the
offender.
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty and mentally
ill who is placed on probation by the sentencing court, shall be
placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board. The Psychiatric Security Review Board shall make treatment
a condition of probation if the defendant is shown to be
treatable and facilities exist for treatment of the offender in a
probation status. Reports as specified by the trial judge shall
be filed with the probation officer and the sentencing court.
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other condition of
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probation, except by agreement with the treating agency and the
Psychiatric Security Review Board, is a basis for the initiation
of probation violation hearings. The period of probation may not
be for fewer than five years or until the expiration of the
defendant's sentence, whichever comes first, and may not be
reduced by the sentencing court without consideration of a
current report on the mental health status of the offender.
(c) Treatment or other care may be provided by or under
contract with the Division of Mental Health, a local mental
health authority, or, with the approval of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board, any other mental health provider. A report
shall be filed with the probation officer and the sentencing
court every three months during the period of probation. If a
motion on a petition to discontinue probation is made by the
defendant, the probation officer shall request a report. A motion
on a petition to discontinue probation may not be heard more than
once every six months.
(10) (a) With regard to persons committed by the court to the
Utah State Hospital or other facility under this section prior to
July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the superintendent
of the Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall petition the
court within 60 days after that date for review of those orders.
The court shall review and modify those orders to include
commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board established under Section 77-38-2.
(b) With regard to persons who have been placed on
probation by the sentencing court under Subsection (9) prior to
July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the executive
director of the Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall
petition the court within 60 days after that date for review of
those orders. The court shall review and modify those orders to
include placement under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board established under Section 77-38-2.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIRK W. DALL,

: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:

Petitioner,
VS.

: CASE NO.

STATE OF UTAH, et al.,

:

Respondents.

:

910902993

The Court having heard this matter and ruled, and now reviewed
petitioner's

and

respondent's

proposed

Findings

of

Fact and

Conclusions of Law, and the Objections to them, now enters these
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner's

request

for

extraordinary

relief

was

originally filed May 10, 1991, and was subsequently amended.
2.

Petitioner requested relief under Rules 65B(b), (c) and

(e) , challenging the finding of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board ("PSRB") that Mr. Dall had received "maximum benefit from
treatment" and should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the
Board of Pardons.
3.

On May 9, 1989, Mr. Dall entered a plea of guilty and

mentally ill to one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse and one count of
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Kidnapping, both second degree felonies.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

ordered that Mr. Dall be transported to the Utah State Hospital for
diagnostic evaluation.
4.

On August

10, 1989, Judge

Hanson

issued

an

order

transferring Mr. Dall to the jurisdiction of the PSRB.
5.

The PSRB held a hearing on April 19, 1991, and entered

its Order dated April 24, 1991, finding that Mr. Dall had received
maximum benefit, and should be transferred to the jurisdiction of
the Board of Pardons.
6.

Petitioner filed his petition on May 10, 1991. An appeal

to the Court of Appeals was also filed.

A stay was obtained from

Judge Scott Daniels. Upon Judge Daniels' retirement, Judge Iwasaki
was assigned.
7.

He recused himself, and this Court was appointed.

Due to a problem with the recording equipment used, no

record was made of the April, 1991 hearing.
8.

An additional hearing was held on July 28, 1991 and has

been transcribed.
the

hearing.

The Court of Appeals ordered the PSRB to hold

All

parties

to

the

hearing

expressed

their

understanding that the new hearing was to correlate to the April
19, 1991 hearing.
9.

The State called no witnesses at the June 28 hearing.

Dr. Philip Washburn was called and examined by counsel for Mr.
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Dall, and cross-examined by the State. Dr. Washburn testified that
Mr. Dall had not received maximum benefit from treatment, and that
Mr. Dall must receive some treatment for the rest of his life. Dr.
Washburn testified that Mr. Dall had reached a "plateau" in his
treatment and was not progressing as rapidly as the Hospital would
like, but that Mr. Dall would still benefit from further treatment
at the Hospital.
10.
that

Mr.

Mr. Dall was returned to the State Hospital.

On July 2, 1991 the PSRB issued a second order finding
Dall

had

received

maximum

benefit

and

should

be

transferred to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons.
11.

At the time Mr. Dall was committed to the jurisdiction of

the PSRB, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-38-2(6) provided for judicial
review of determinations of the PSRB.
12.

Effective March 13, 1990, Section 77-38-2(6) was amended

to provide appeal only for persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity.
13.
providing
Hospital.

Effective March 13, 1990, Section 77-16a-5 was enacted,
a maximum

benefit

standard

for

transfer

from

the

(This section was repealed July 1, 1992, but the same

standard is currently codified in Section 77-16a-203(3)(a)(ii)).
14.

Mr. Dall appealed the PSRB's decision to the Court of

Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Dall had no right of appeal
from the PSRB's decision.
15.

An evidentiary hearing before this Court was held on June

14, 1993, with closing arguments heard on August 4, 1993.
16.

At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Verville testified on

behalf of the State that the Hospital did not interpret the maximum
benefit standard as relaxing the standard for transfer of a person
to the Board of Pardons.
17.

Mr. Verville testified that the Hospital applied a

clinical standard in assessing petitioner's mental condition.
18.

This Court issued a minute entry reflecting a decision on

August 13, 1993.
19.

Petitioner filed post-judgment motions pursuant to Rules

52(a), 59(e) , and 62(b) and (d) , on August 19, 1992.

In this

Court's absence, an ex-parte stay order was signed by Presiding
Judge Michael R. Murphy, pending further order of this Court.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner's request for relief is denied.

2.

This action is properly

("where an

analyzed under Rule 65B(e)

inferior court, administrative

agency, or officer

exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or

oc
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To the extent petitioner relies on Rule

65B(b) (wrongful imprisonment) and Rule 65B(c) (other wrongful
restraints on personal liberty), such claims are found to be
inappropriate and are dismissed with prejudice.
3.

There is no substantive difference, at least in their

application,

between

the

Hospital's

clinical

practice

in

transferring guilty and mentally ill individuals before 1990 and
after the statutory adoption of the maximum benefit standard in
199CK
4.

The State Hospital's policies and procedures for transfer

under the applicable statutes were not arbitrary and capricious,
and therefore were in conformity with the law.
5.

Because transfer under the applicable statutes at the

time of Mr. Dall's commitment to the PSRB in 1989, and at the time
of 1991 PSRB hearing were, for all intents and purposes identical,
application of the "maximum benefit" standard to Mr. Dall does not
make imposition of Mr. Dall's punishment more burdensome, and thus
does not violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal or Utah
Constitutions.
6.

This Court cannot find that the conditions at the Utah

State Prison constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The mental

health unit at the Utah State Prison is capable of meeting Mr.
Dall's medical and mental health needs, as they presently exist.
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A review of the 30 page Settlement reached between the

parties in Henrv v. Deland. Civil No. 89-C-1124J

(D. Utah),

convinces the Court that the facilities at the mental health unit
are neither inadequate, nor cruel and unusual.
8.

The treatment issues and Mr. Dall's mental condition, and

the appropriateness of his transfer from the State Hospital to the
jurisdiction of the state's Board of Pardons, are all issues that
are particularly within the purview and expertise of the PSRB.
9.

The Board was not exercising a clearly judicial function

when it transferred jurisdiction of Mr. Dall to the Board of
Pardons.

Judge Hanson had already carried out the judicially-

authorized function of imposing sentence in 1989.

The Board was

merely carrying out that sentence in accordance with their lawful
powers and authority.
10.

Where

there

is no

statute

specifically

authorizing

judicial review, review may be had by "traditional means" of
extraordinary writ.
11.

The PSRB's action does not violate the separation of

powers provision of the Utah Constitution.
12.

The lack of an appeal right from decisions of the PSRB

for persons other than those found not guilty by reason of insanity
does not violate Mr. Dall's right to appeal under Article I,

0C5

PAGE SEVEN

DALL V. STATE

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Sections 7 and 12, and Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution.
13.

The

PSRB's

transfer

decision

does

not

constitute

imposition of a sentence, but is merely reflective of the execution
of a lawfully imposed sentence.

The hearing before the PSRB was

not a critical stage of the proceedings entitling petitioner to
compulsory process (or financial access to expert testimony).
14.

The petitioner's request that the decision of the PSRB be

set aside is denied.
15.

This Court's Order Of Stay is lifted, based upon the

foregoing.

s^~}
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Findings

following, this,

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law,

to the

of November, 1993:

Mark R. Moffat
Robert K. Heineman
Attorneys for Petitioner
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James H. Beadles
Lorenzo K. Miller
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorney for Respondents
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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